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NOTES
NEUTRALIZING THE THREAT: RECONSIDERING EXISTING DOCTRINES
IN THE EMERGING WAR ON TERRORISM
Frank A. Biggio*
INTRODUCTION
A. A Day Unlike Any Other...
NAIROBI, Kenya - August 7, 1998 began as a routine business day
for Francis Opeola. 1 As the president of a major bank, he often found
himself visiting the businesses of clients to confirm administrative details,
negotiate new deals, or just socialize. But as he turned onto Haile Selassie
Avenue on the way back to his office after one of these meetings, the
morning became anything but normal. While reaching for his car phone,
Francis suddenly felt "a heavy blanket of heat" slam into him followed
immediately by a deafening roar. His first thoughts were that he had been
blindsided by another vehicle, but once he gathered his wits, he saw an
enormous cloud of smoke about one mile down the avenue where the U.S.
embassy was located. An explosive-rigged car that was parked behind the
embassy detonated its cargo, reducing it and several nearby buildings to
rubble. While Francis was not injured, others were not so fortunate. Scores
of people inside the buildings and on the streets outside, including a
busload of school children, were killed instantly and thousands more were
wounded.
Moments earlier, and 400 miles to the south, an equally destructive
scene occurred as a gasoline tanker exploded in front of the U.S. embassy
in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Amid the horror of these events, hundreds of
bystanders at both sites made frantic efforts to treat the wounded, recover
* B.A., Dennison University; J.D., M.B.A., Case Western Reserve University, January
2002. This Note is dedicated to the Chindits, past, present and future, and especially those
of IOC 4-94, who are on the front lines of the war against terrorism everyday.
** The final draft of this note was completed in March, 2001. Although since that time
many of the facts and names herein have become common knowledge, the editorial decision
was made to publish the Note substantially as originally written.
The events recounted here are based on a discussion the author had with Mr. Opeola, a
close family friend.
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bodies from the buildings and rescue people trapped in the rubble.2 In all,
the two attacks killed 301 people and injured over 5000.3
The coordination and magnitude of the bombings strongly suggested
that amateurs were not responsible. As F.B.I. agents and other U.S.
officials, assisted by Kenyan and Tanzanian police, began to inspect the
rubble, collect evidence, and interview witnesses, fingers began to point
toward one suspect as the most likely culprit behind the acts of terror, and
results from the investigations strengthened those suspicions.
Less than two weeks after the bombings at the embassies, in what was
the most "formidable American military assault .. .against a private
sponsor of terrorism,"5 the United States launched dozens of cruise missiles
on two sites, one in Afghanistan and one in Sudan, suspected of having
close links with the mastermind of the bombings. These events brought to
the forefront of the world's consciousness the identity of a new face of
international terrorism - Osama bin Laden.6
Bin Laden again emerged as headline news on October 12, 2000. As
the USS COLE, a Navy destroyer, pulled into a refueling port in Aden,
Yemen, a small boat loaded with explosives rammed its side. Seventeen
U.S. sailors were killed and dozens more were injured in the apparent
suicide attack.7  Despite some initial speculation by the Yemeni
government that the blast was an accident, they later acknowledged that it
8
was indeed a terrorist attack. Not surprisingly, at the top of the list of
suspects was the U.S.'s chief bogeyman Osama bin Laden.9 Fears that
2 For an initial account of the events, see James C. McKinley, Jr., Bombs Rip Apart
Two Embassies in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1998, at Al.
3 See OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE,
PATrERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1998, at 6-7 (1999) [hereinafter PA'rrERNS OF GLOBAL
TERRORISM 1998].
4 See, e.g., Johanna McGeary, Terror in Africa, TIME, Aug. 17, 1998, at 32; McKinley,
supra note 2; see also, Interview by Tim Russert with Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State
(Aug. 9, 1998), available at http://secretary.state.gov/www.statements/1998/980809.html.
5 See James Bennet, U.S. Cruise Missiles Strike Sudan and Afghan Targets Tied to
Terrorist Network, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, at Al.
6 Several spelling variations of Osama bin Laden's name exist. For purposes of
consistency, this note will use "bin Laden" even in instances when sources have different
spellings or use an elongated form of his name, except in titles of cited sources.
7 See, e.g., John F. Bums, Blast Kills Sailors on U.S. Ship in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
13, 2000, at Al.
8 See, e.g., Greg Jaffe & Gary Fields, Yemenis Link Two Saudis to Terrorist Attack on
U.S. Navy Ship, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2000, at A23; see also, John F. Bums, Yemenis Now
Say That Ship Blast Was Criminal Act, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2000, at Al.
9 See, e.g., Neil King, Jr. & Christopher Cooper, Saudi Exile Seen Poised to Attack,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2000, at A17; see also Greg Jaffe & Christopher Cooper, Former
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follow-up attacks were imminent put U.S. forces at a high state of alert in
the Gulf region and throughout the world.10
The U.S. has made many efforts and pleas to Afghanistan's Taliban11
(where bin Laden is presumed to be living) to turn bin Laden over to law
Commander Says Yemen Was 'Best Option' to Refuel Ships, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2000, at
A4.
10 See, e.g., King & Cooper, supra note 9.
'1 The Taliban controls about 90% of Afghanistan; see Unban the Taliban, ECONOMIST,
July 24, 1999, at 19. Having come into power in 1996, the Taliban is the predominant
government faction in Afghanistan, however it is only recognized as a legitimate
government by three other COUNTRIES - Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates; see Justin Marozzi, Dogs of War Fall Silent, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 3-4, 2001.
Afghanistan has become isolated from the rest of the world, economically and politically,
since the Taliban came into power. When Russian forces ended their war in Afghanistan
and left the country in the early 1980s, a fierce civil war began between militias loyal to the
Taliban and rebel Mujahidin fighters. The Taliban has directed what little money it has
toward the war effort rather than to more socially productive efforts.
When considering the likelihood of having a rational negotiating session with the
Taliban, consider how the Taliban's Ministry of Vice and Promotion of Virtue handles some
"criminal" offenses: shaving of one's beard is a criminal offense; see The Taliban Dilemma,
ECONOMIST, Dec. 16, 2000, at 44. Suspected homosexuals are buried under a mud wall -
survival proves one's innocence; see Where's the World's Worst?, ECONOMIST: The World
in 2001, at 56. A visiting Pakistani soccer team had their heads shaved as punishment for
wearing shorts. Id. See also What's News - Worldwide, "Afghanistan's Taliban rulers
jailed..." WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2001, at Al. (Barbers who gave "Leonardo DiCaprio"
haircuts were jailed because the hair fell in the men's eyes when they prayed). Women's
rights are virtually non-existent. Women in Afghanistan are prohibited from leaving their
homes unless accompanied by a brother or husband. They are denied access to public
education. A woman who commits adultery can expect to be stoned to death, yet no such
fate will await her accomplice; see, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Are Human Rights Universal?,
80 FOREIGN AFF. 191 (Jan./Feb. 2001).
As further evidence of the fanaticism of the Taliban, a recently issued edict would
require non-Muslims to wear distinguishing clothing - eerily reminiscent of Nazi Germany's
rules for its Jewish citizens at the outset of World War II; see What's News-Worldwide,
"Non-Muslims would be required to wear...," WALL ST. J., May 22, 2001, at Al. Another
edict declared that anyone converting to Christianity would be executed; see The Monster,
ECONOMIST, May 26, 2001, at 12.
The dispute between the United States and Afghanistan takes on added flavor when it
is noted that, although the United States does not formally recognize the Taliban as the
government of Afghanistan, it is making serious demands on the Taliban and is spearheading
the imposition of sanctions on it. Whether the Taliban, as successor to a signatory
government of a number of extradition treaties, is yet bound thereby is a topic worthy of
another research article. For a superb overview of the history of the Taliban, life under its
regime, and policy implications for the U.N. and the United States in formally recognizing
the Taliban, see Christopher L. Gadoury, Should the United States Officially Recognize the
Taliban? The International Legal and Political Considerations, 23 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 385
(2001).
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enforcement officials. 12  Unfortunately, these diplomatic attempts have
been thwarted by a lack of cooperation by Afghanistan.' 3  Because
Afghanistan is an economically and politically isolated country, multi-
lateral efforts such as trade embargoes and other sanctions have enjoyed
little success in convincing the Taliban to cooperate with the U.S. by
extraditing bin Laden or trying him under acceptable international law for
the crimes for which he has been indicted. 14 In fact, it is apparent that the
Taliban is actually affording bin Laden considerable protection in
Afghanistan. 1
This lack of cooperation has left the U.S. on the horns of a
considerable dilemma: whether to continue to negotiate an agreement with
Afghanistan or to take a less diplomatic approach such as military action
against bin Laden's headquarters in Afghanistan. Diplomatic efforts such
as negotiations, easing of economic sanctions or promises of aid to
Afghanistan would be preferable. Unfortunately, such efforts could take
years and ultimately fail to achieve a favorable outcome. In the meantime,
bin Laden would have the opportunity to continue his deadly actions.
Aggressive military action, on the other hand, could result in an immediate
end to the threat posed by bin Laden. This option, however, is also not
without its potential drawbacks. Concerns such as establishing sufficient
evidence to justify action, the appropriate proportionality of responses,
accuracy of the identity of proposed targets, and territorial integrity arise
when military action is considered in such a situation. Unfortunately, there
is not much room for a "middle ground" in the solutions to this dilemma
and the U.S. will likely be forced to choose the latter option.
B. Toward a New Paradigm of International Law
This Note will advance two novel claims. First, acts of terrorism
16
against a country by non-state sponsored organizations or individuals need
to be considered more than just criminal acts. Instead, they should be
considered acts of war against the victim nation. Accordingly, the
12 See, e.g., Robin Allen, 'Like Finding a Needle in a Burning Haystack,' FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 20, 2000, at 9; see also Farhan Bokhari & Stephen Fidler, Tight Security Around bin
Laden, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2000, at 2.
13 See, e.g., Bokhari & Fidler, supra note 12.
14 See id.
15 See id.
16 This Note will focus on international terrorism, meaning acts that are generally
considered terrorist in nature, which are conducted across international borders. Acts such
as the Oklahoma City bombing and those of the Una-Bomber, although clearly having
terrorist characteristics, should remain classified as crimes and handled within the judicial
system of the country in which they were committed.
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traditional notions of war should be expanded to include rogue terrorists
17
and their organizations as potential adversaries. Second, if a nation can
declare war against a non-state sponsored organization, international laws
must make concessions that will allow a country to prosecute such a war by
conducting limited intrusions into the sovereign territory of another nation
if that nation is unable or unwilling to cooperate with efforts to prevent
further terrorist acts by groups or individuals operating within their
boundaries.
The first claim will be supported by an analysis of the changing nature
of the threats the world faces today. Just as the drug trade has emerged as a
critical foreign policy concern, resulting in "The War on Drugs," terrorism
is also a primary threat to the safety of the world's citizens. Whereas the
War on Drugs seems to be more of a chest-thumping exercise in rhetorical
speech,' 8 however, the potential threat posed by terrorism is more, wide-
ranging and immediate to the world community. The need for a "war on
terrorism" will be established by considering the unique nature of terrorist
organizations as adversaries unwilling to engage in rational negotiations
(which essentially precludes non-violent resolution of disputes), a historical
look at "Just War" theory, and demonstrating that terrorism is a universal
threat.
The second claim of this note, that violations of another nation's
sovereignty are justified in the war against terrorism, is much more
controversial. This claim will be supported through an analysis of historical
treatises such as the Caroline Doctrine and United Nations Charter Article
51. The argument will focus on the need for existing doctrines to be
interpreted more broadly in light of the increased emergence of terrorism, a
threat not fully contemplated at the time these instruments were drafted.
I. THE THREAT OF TERRORISM
A. Historical and Current Perspectives
Terrorism has been likened to a "cancer" of the modern world. 19
Although the word 'terrorism' has been in use for just over two centuries,
stemming from the regime de la terreur in revolutionary France in the late
17 The term "rogue terrorists" will be used extensively throughout this Note and is
intended to imply individual terrorists or groups of terrorists who are not operating under the
authority of any nation's government.
18 This is not intended to downplay the threat of drug traffic into the United States and
the many dangers it poses. By all recent accounts, however, the U.S. government does not
appear to be achieving many significant victories in the War on Drugs at the expense of the
taxpayer.
19 Paul Johnson, The Cancer of Terrorism, in TERRORsM: HOW THE WEST CAN WIN 31
(Benjamin Netanyahu ed., 1986).
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18th century,2° its philosophy and aims have existed for thousands of years.
The famous Chinese tactician/philosopher Sun Tzu summarized the goal of
terrorism when he wrote: "Kill one - frighten ten thousand.,
21
Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has stated that
terrorism "is the biggest threat to our country and the world as we enter the
21" Century, ' 22 a threat that is even more frightening in light of its
unpredictable nature and the potential for widespread casualties. U.S.
policy tenets have traditionally taken a hard-line stance against terrorism,
individual terrorists, and state sponsors of terrorism, 23 and combating
terrorism is one of the seven fundamental interests in the U.S. strategic plan
for foreign affairs.2 Recognizing the growing threat terrorism poses, many
state and federal agencies in the United States have made contingency
planning for terrorist attacks a top priority.
2 5
Although the United States has been the victim of many of the most
visible and devastating terrorist attacks in recent years, the threat of
terrorism is a universal problem that potentially affects all nations. As
evidenced by the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, terrorism can occur in
unpredictable places, even those that have relatively benign relations with
the rest of the world. Of the 301 deaths in those two bombings, only twelve
were Americans, 26 despite the obvious anti-American message intended.
The frightening randomness of the bombings in Africa put the world on
alert that similar acts could occur in any country, regardless of location or
alliances.
B. The Conundrum
Despite the clear threat posed by terrorism throughout the world, the
term terrorism remains clouded in definitional opaqueness, situational
20 MICHAEL CONNOR, TERRORISM: ITS GOALS, ITS TARGETS, ITS METHODS, THE
SOLUTIONS 1 (1987).
21 See RICHARD CLUTrERBUCK, TERRORISM IN AN UNSTABLE WORLD 3 (1994).
22 See Interview by Katie Couric with Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State, Aug. 21,
1998, available at http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980821.html.
23 See OmCE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE,
PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1999, at iii (2000). [hereinafter PATrERNS OF GLOBAL
TERRORISM 1999].
24 See Richard N. Gardner, The One Percent Solution, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 4 (July/Aug.
2000).
25 See, e.g., Queena Sook Kim, Preparing for the Worst at the 2002 Winter Games,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2000, at BI (discussing preparations being taken by Utah law
enforcement and medical workers for the possibility of a terrorist attack at the upcoming
Olympic Games in Salt Lake City).
26 See PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1998, supra note 3, at 1. Additionally, of the
more than 5,000 who were wounded in the two embassy bombings, only seven were
Americans.
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dependency, and moral ambiguity. Many books and lengthy articles
discuss in detail the definitional quagmire posed by terrorism. Images of
terrorists can range from an indiscriminately murderous psychopath, to a
highly articulate leader of an oppressed people who reluctantly turns to
violence as the last means available to fight a just cause. Some definitions
of terrorists could even include organizations that carry actions that amount
to little more than elaborate fraternity pranks (such as the Garden Gnome
Liberation Front28).
Further confounding the issue is the fact that some militant groups that
have conducted terrorist activity in the past are now looked to as essential
players in negotiating peace accords. The African National Congress,
Irish Republican Army, and Palestine Liberation Organization are just a
few organizations whose current or former members now hold seats as
respected heads of government or legitimate bargaining agents despite
years of conducting terrorist campaigns. 30  Nelson Mandela and Yasser
Arafat, both recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize, were at one time labeled as
terrorists. 31 Some have argued that the U.S. strikes on suspected terrorist
sites in Sudan and Afghanistan or the bombing of Libya in 1986 were
terrorist acts despite their intended anti-terrorist message.
The definitional debate will certainly continue well into the future and
its slipperiness may hamper working international conventions that would
attempt to combat terrorism. When faced with the perplexing task of
developing a universally acceptable definition of terrorism, it may be easier
to paraphrase Justice Potter Stewart's response when asked to define
pornography; "I know it when I see it."'33 Skirting around the definitional
27 See, e.g., Paul Johnson, supra note 19; CONNOR, supra note 20, at 2; ALONA E. EVANS
& JOHN F. MURPHY, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 1 (1978).
28 See John-Thor Dahlburg, France's Littlest Victims: Stolen Garden Gnomes, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 15, 2000, at A2. This "terrorist group" conducted a covert raid on an exhibition
of small ceramic garden decorations. In their statement to Paris authorities, they demanded
the "immediate closing of this odious exhibit, as well as the unconditional liberation of the
garden gnomes still detained." Whether the GGLF decides to resort to violence as a means
of achieving its goals remains to be seen, but seems unlikely. For a condensed version of
this article, see Cheery Garden Gnomes Disappearing in France, THE PLAIN DEALER,
Apr. 16, 2000, at 13A.
29 See, e.g., Stephen J. Glain et al., Militant Groups Emerge as Key in Bid to Halt
Mideast Clashes, WALL ST. J., Oct, 10, 2000, at A21.
30 id.
31 See, e.g., Leah M. Campbell, Defending Against Terrorism: A Legal Analysis of the
Decision to Strike Sudan and Afghanistan, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1067, 1071 (2000).
32 See, e.g., The New Terrorism, Coming to a city near you, ECONOMIST, Aug. 15, 1998,
at 19 (quoting Martin von Creveld, an Israeli expert on terrorism and warfare, who stated
that "when you fight terrorism, you become a terrorist").
33 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
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issue, however, may only result in further confusion and lack of
cooperation among countries trying to combat terrorism.
The United States has broadly, but sufficiently, defined terrorism as
the "unlawful use of violence against the United States, citizens of the
United States or any other nation, outside the boundaries of the United
States, apparently intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population,
influence government policy, or to affect the conduct of a government for
political or social objectives. '34 It is important to note the inclusion of
"outside the boundaries of the United States." This indicates that the
drafters fully understood the increasing global American presence and
believed that terrorism against U.S. citizens needed to be addressed beyond
just domestic boundaries. Whether using the U.S. definition or Justice
Stewart's "test," the sections to follow will clearly demonstrate that Osama
bin Laden is indeed a terrorist.
C. Terrorists as Hostes Humani Generis
Hostes Humani Generis means "enemy of the human race. 35 This
doctrine, which came into prominence near the end of the 1 8 th century as
sea piracy was becoming more widespread, considers some acts as so
egregious that they are "universally culpable. 36
Two factors must be considered in order for a person or act to be
considered an "enemy of the human race:" the magnitude of the threat
posed by the acts, and the universal condemnation of the acts. 37 The
doctrine's purpose was to prevent those who perpetrated violations of the
law of nations from avoiding their civil and criminal liability by fleeing the
locus of the crime; in essence, "their liability followed them everywhere."
38
The significance of hostes humani generis is that all nations have a duty to
enforce international laws, regardless of whether the perpetrator's acts had
anything to do with the forum state.39 In the example of piracy, the threat
posed by pirates was considered as such a threat to the welfare and
commerce of all nations that any nation who apprehended them had the• 40
right to apply their laws to the crimes committed by pirates.
34 Antiterrorism Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-519, 104 Stat. 2250 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2331).
35 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 738 (6th ed. 1990).
36 See generally Jeffery M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over
International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53 (1981).
37 See id. at 61.
38 See id.
39 See id.
40 See id.
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Terrorists, through activities such as torture, hostage-taking, and
indiscriminate murder, are also common enemies of humankind, and should
enjoy no safe harbor from justice. As terrorists "direct their disastrous
attacks against all nations by destroying the foundation of common
safety,"'4  they "may be exterminated wherever they are caught. 42
Regardless of the specific focus of their ire, rogue bands of terrorists with
an agenda of wreaking havoc and death on citizens of a country whose
foreign policy position they disagree with are a threat to the security of
mankind in general. These terrorists should operate with the understanding
that their activities may be countered with force as devastating as that
which they are wrongfully inflicting on others. The shield of sovereignty
by a complicit or hapless host nation should not be a sufficient barrier to
conduct necessary acts of self-defense.
Applying the "enemy of mankind" moniker to terrorism raises the
question of whether it meets the requirements of this category. Since the
general guidelines for an individual or act to qualify as hostes humani
generis may be broadly construed, this may be another example of
definitional ambiguity hampering effective resolutions. While there can be
no doubt that large-scale acts of genocide such as those that occurred in
Rwanda and the Balkans in recent years are universally condemnable acts
and would meet the hostes humani generis definition, are the deaths of a
handful of individuals in a few isolated incidents sufficient to be
categorized as such? Excluding the African embassy bombings, the total
number of deaths resulting from terrorist attacks in 1998 was just 440.43
While this is a relatively small number, it still does not exempt terrorists
from being classified as enemies of mankind. The nature of the crime of
terrorism is to strike fear into millions by killing only a handful. The
violent attempts to change another nation's foreign policy position
combined with the simple fact that many acts of terrorism result in multiple
murder should be enough to label those engaging in its practice as enemies
of mankind.
II. UNDERSTANDING OSAMA BIN LADEN
Although this Note argues for the development of a new general
international norm, it will rely on the example of Osama bin Laden and the
Afghanistan Taliban government as a pressing illustration of why this new
norm must be adopted. The following section will provide a brief
biography of bin Laden, a description of the fatwa (Holy War) he has
declared against the United States, his links to other terrorist attacks, and
41 Louis Rene Beres, Assassination of Terrorists May be Law-Enforcing: A Brief
According to International Law, at http://www.freeman.io.com/m-online/nov97/beres2.htm.
42 Id.
43 PATrERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1998, supra note 3, at 2.
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the attempts to achieve a diplomatic resolution with the Taliban to extradite
him.
A. A Brief Biography of Osama Bin laden
Born in the 1950s in Saudi Arabia, Osama bin Laden was the
seventeenth son of the construction mogul Muhammad bin Laden.
44
Muhammad had close ties to the Saudi king who issued a decree that all
government construction contracts must go to the bin Laden company.45
This decree occurred just as heavy oil production began in the country and
the rapid large-scale building spree that followed led to Muhammad quickly
amassing a fortune.
Soon after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Osama bin
Laden joined the Afghan resistance movement, serving as a financier,
recruiter and trainer to Arab nationals who volunteered to fight the
Soviets.46 For bin Laden, volunteering in the fight against the Russians was
an opportunity to fulfill his jihad (religious duty) and fight the enemies of
Islam.4 7  During the war, he established al-Qaida ("The Base") in
Afghanistan, which served as a headquarters for other Islamic extremists.
48
After the Russo-Afghan war, bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia but
felt that the country was abandoning its Islamic ideals. 49 As U.S. troops
began pouring into Saudi Arabia prior to the Gulf War in 1990 and 1991,
bin Laden was appalled that the Saudi government could allow these troops
(which included Jewish and female soldiers) into the sacred lands of Mecca
and Medina.50 He moved to Sudan in 1991 but traveled extensively
between several Islamic nations, developing stronger links to militant
Islamic groups and individuals.51
In 1994, after several years of harshly criticizing the ruling al-Saud
family, bin Laden was stripped of his Saudi citizenship and disowned by his
family, but not before inheriting a fortune from his father.52 Under intense
44 See PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1999, supra note 23, at 31.
45 See Hunting bin Laden (PBS television broadcast, Mar. 21, 2000), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen [hereinafter PBS Broadcast].
46 See PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1999, supra note 23, at 31.
47 See PBS Broadcast, supra note 45.
48 See PATrERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1999, supra note 23, at 31.
49 See PBS Transcript, supra note 45.
50 See id.
51 See id.
52 See id. See also Today's New Cult Hero, EcONOMIST, Aug. 29, 1998, at 44
[hereinafter Today's New Cult Hero].
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international pressure, Sudan was forced to expel him in 1996 and he found
refuge in Afghanistan at al-Qaida 3
B. Bin Laden's Links to Other Acts of Terrorism
Although the embassy bombings and the attack on the USS COLE are
two of the most well known incidents attributed to bin Laden, he has also
been linked to many other acts of violence directed at the United States.
The C.I.A. has named him as the provider of financial backing for the
bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City in 1993, in which
six people were killed and many wounded.54 U.S. Intelligence officials
suspect that bin Laden may have trained the troops and provided some of
the weapons used in shooting down two U.S. helicopters in Mogadishu,
Somalia in October 1993, resulting in the deaths of eighteen U.S. Army
Rangers.55 Additionally, he has been implicated in the 1996 bombing of the
Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia that left nineteen U.S. servicemen dead. 6
There are suspicions that bin Laden is linked to the kidnapping of sixteen
tourists in Yemen in December 1998. 57 A potentially devastating attack on
thousands of civilians visiting Jordan on the eve of the new millennium has
recently been revealed. 8 Bin Laden has even been linked to a foiled plan to
assassinate Pope John Paul HI.
59
Although bin Laden has denied involvement in these incidents, he has
praised the perpetrators as "heroes ' 6° and admitted to "instigating ' 61 many
attacks against American targets around the world. When the United States
was successful in obtaining the extradition of Mir Aimal Kansi for his
connection with the World Trade Center bombing, bin Laden encouraged
Muslims to retaliate against the U.S. prosecutor assigned to the case.62 He
has proudly congratulated other militant groups on their formal
designations by the United States as terrorist organizations. 63 As the trial of
53 Today's New Cult Hero, supra note 52.
5 See id.
55 See, e.g., Vince Cannistraro, The World's Most Dangerous Terrorist, ABCNEWS.com
article, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/terrormain980610.html.
56 See, e.g., Today's New Cult Hero, supra note 52.
57 See generally Plots and Super Plots, ECONOMIST, Jan. 9, 1999, at 43.
58 See Judith Miller, Dissecting a Terror Plot From Boston to Amman, N.Y. TIMES,
January 15, 2001, at Al.
59 See Jay Winik, Security Comes before Liberty, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2001, at A26.
60 See id.
61 PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1999, supra note 23, at 31.
62 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE,
PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1997, at 8 (1998).
63 See id.
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several of his alleged followers indicted for the African embassy bombings
gets underway in New York,64 bin Laden's association with many other acts
of terror throughout the world may be unraveled.
C. Bin Laden's Declaration of War Against the United
States
On February 23, 1998, Al-Quds al-Arabi, a London-based Arabic
newspaper published the "Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad
Against the Jews and Crusaders., 65 At the top of the list of signatures on
the document was Osama bin Laden's, followed by those of leaders of
several other militant Islamic groups. The document criticizes the U.S. role
in the Gulf War and its continued presence in the region, accusing it of
"occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of its territories, plundering its
riches, overwhelming its rulers, humiliating its people, threatening its
neighbors, and using its bases in the peninsula as a spearhead to fight
against the neighboring Islamic peoples.
It further declares that the continued presence of American forces in
Arabia is "a clear declaration of war by the Americans against God, his
Prophet, and the Muslims," 67 and that according to the ulema (authorities on
theology and Islamic law, called shari'a), it is the duty of all Muslims to
fight the invaders of Muslim lands.68 The document concludes with afatwa
(final ruling or declaration of holy war) imploring Muslims to engage in
jihad against Americans. It states that:
To kill Americans and their allies, both civil and military, is an individual
duty of every Muslim who is able, in any country where this is possible,
until the [holy sites] are freed from their grip and until their armies,
shattered and broken-winged, depart from all lands of Islam, incapable of
threatening any Muslim.
By God's leave, we call on every Muslim who believes in God and hopes
for reward to obey God's command to kill the Americans and plunder
their possessions wherever he finds them and whenever he can. Likewise
we call on the Muslim ulema and leaders and youth and soldiers to launch
attacks against the armies of the American devils and against those who
are allied with them from among the helpers of Satan. 69
64 See, e.g., Jerry Markon, Embassy Bombing Trial Arguments Start, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6,
2001, at B 10.
65 See Bernard Lewis, License to Kill: Usama bin Ladin's Declaration of Jihad, 77
FoREIGN AFF. 14 (Nov./Dec. 1998).
66 See id.
67 See id. at 15.
68 See id.
69 See id.
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This is a clear declaration of war against the United States. As many
Muslims have pointed out, the nature of Islam speaks more about peace
than war and none of the Islamic texts advocate terrorism or murder.7°
Osama bin Laden's pronouncement is an embarrassment to the majority of
Muslims throughout the world and largely ignored as the senseless
recitations of a lunatic. Yet, as the many events bin Laden's followers have
committed clearly indicate, it only takes a few zealots to carry out such an
order, and the results have been deadly.
D. The Indictment Against bin Laden
In 1998, federal court in Manhattan has charged bin Laden, his toR
lieutenant, Muhammed Atef, and several others in a 238-count indictment.
The U.S. government has also offered a $5 million reward for information
leading to his apprehension.72 Although this indictment was released after
the bombings in Africa, it was submitted several months before and was
made public with the addition of further charges after the embassy
bombings.73 Some of those indicted have been apprehended in Germany
and Britain and have been extradited or are awaiting extradition to the
United States. 4 But bin Laden remains at large, and he will continue to
spread his wave of terror until he is stopped.
E. Failed Diplomatic Efforts
After the bombings in Africa, the U.S. demanded that the Taliban hand
bin Laden over to law enforcement officials. Despite a unanimous vote by
the U.N. Security Council to impose sanctions on Afghanistan75 and an
Executive Order by President Clinton barring business activity between
U.S. and Afghani businesses,76 the Taliban still scoffed at cooperation. The
Taliban leader Mullah Omar seems to have enjoyed antagonizing the
70 See id. at 19.
71 See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, Saudi is Indicted in Bomb Attacks on U.S. Embassies,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at Al.
72 See FBI Ten Most Wanted Fugitive List, at http://www.fbi.gov/mostwant/topten/
fugitives/laden.htm.
73 See, e.g., Weiser, supra note 71, at A8.
74 See, e.g., David Johnston & Steven Lee Myers, Investigation of Attack on U.S.
Destroyer Moving Slowly, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2000, at A10; see also Markon, supra note
64.
75 See, e.g., Barbara Crossette, U.S. Steps Up Pressure on Taliban to Deliver Osama bin
Laden, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1999, at A7.
76 Exec. Order No. 13,129, 3 C.F.R. 200-203 (1999), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701
(1999).
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United States by harboring bin Laden. 7 According to some sources, he
feels that extraditing bin Laden, who enjoys hero status in Afghanistan
because of his contributions in the fight against the Soviets in the 1980s,
would be "tantamount to leaving a pillar of our religion, 78 and that
acquiescence to U.S. pressure could damage the Taliban's credentials
among some Muslim extremists.7 9 After the attack on the USS COLE, and
amid further pressure to turn bin Laden over, the Taliban instead increased
the security around bin Laden, 80 further frustrating the United States and
making it clearer that drastic measures may be the only remedy to prevent
further action by him. While the Taliban has recently hinted that it may be
open to turning bin Laden over to authorities, it has qualified this statement
by insisting that it would do so only to a Muslim country where he would
be tried by Islamic judges. 81 This "concession" is unlikely to gain U.S.
approval.
With his inherited wealth estimated at well over $300 million, bin
Laden has had little trouble recruiting followers from a variety of
nationalities and backgrounds. Some of the suspects named or apprehended
after the African embassy bombings have included Egyptians, Palestinians,
Saudis, and even a former American serviceman.82 Bin laden has sent his
followers to conduct training in such diverse locations as Central Asia,
Bosnia, Northeast Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Philippines.83 His
wide-ranging web of followers and organizations that are trained or funded
by him has left the world with a sense of vulnerability rarely felt before. To
further add to this frightening potential, bin Laden has hinted at a desire to
develop and employ weapons of mass destruction.84 With such a looming
threat, backed by sufficient funding, the need to take extreme measures
against bin Laden is apparent.
85
77 See, e.g., Rory McCarthy, The Guardian: Afghan Leader Refuses to Give up bin Laden
to U.S., at http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4045076,00.html.
78 See id.
79 See, e.g., In Charge Again, ECONOMIST, Aug. 29, 1998, at 42.
80 See, e.g., Bokhari & Fidler, supra note 12.
81 See, e.g., Afghans May Hand Over bin Laden, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at 5.
82 PA~rERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1999, supra note 23, at 31; see also Bokhari &
Fidler, supra note 12.
83 See PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1999, supra note 23, at 31.
84 See id.
85 The recent trial in New York somewhat weakens this argument, however. It appears
that bin Laden has some miserly characteristics when it comes to distributing his wealth to
his followers, prompting several of them to become disenchanted with the organization -
apparently radical behavior does not always come cheap. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, Trial
Poked Holes in Image of bin Laden's Terror Group, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2001, at Al.
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III. FOUNDATIONS FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL NORM
A. The U.S. Cruise Missile Strikes in Sudan and
Afghanistan
The U.S. strikes against a terrorist camp in Afghanistan and a
pharmaceutical plant suspected of producing VX gas in Sudan drew both
praise and ire from the world community, sparking widespread debate in
many circles. In order to lend credence to the first claim of this Note, the
argument that terrorism is an act of war, it is necessary to evaluate the
reasoning behind the critics and supporters of the strikes, the legal support
for both sides of the argument, and the historical context of the doctrines
and other legal theories relied upon by them.
Many U.S. allies, such as Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan,
Australia, and Israel, issued statements of support following the U.S. strikes
in Afghanistan and Sudan.86 Other countries, such as Russia, China, and
Pakistan,87 condemned the attacks as "unilateral and unwarranted. 88 Kofi
Annan, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, issued a statement
recognizing the "global menace" of terrorism but criticizing "individual
actions by member states" against state and non-state sponsored terrorism.
89
Although Annan's statement was not explicitly directed at the United
States, it was certainly an implicit condemnation of the U.S. actions.
Several Arab states felt that the strikes and the apparently cavalier approach
by which they were conducted were "arrogant" acts of hegemony by the
United States.90 As expected, the governments of Sudan and Afghanistan
issued statements protesting the strikes. In the words of the Sudanese
representative to the United Nations, they were "[an] iniquitous act of
86 See, e.g., Uri Pan & Tracy Conner, Ignored Boris Goes Ballistic, N.Y. POST, Aug. 22,
1998, at A5; see also William Drozdiak, Chorus of Cheers from U.S. Allies, WASH. POST,
Aug. 21, 1998, at A20.
87 Pakistan may at first seem like an unlikely voice in the throng of critics. However, the
crux of their concern was that the United States violated their airspace when launching the
cruise missile strikes against Afghanistan and not only did not seek or gain permission from
the Pakistani government to do so, but did not even inform them that their airspace would be
used. This occurred at a time when tensions between Pakistan and India were particularly
tense and unidentified cruise missiles streaming through the air would certainly be a cause
for concern. This issue, although not to be taken lightly, is beyond the scope of this Note.
88 See Drozdiak, supra note 86; see also Allies Back U.S. Strikes, Russia Among the
Dissenters, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB., Aug. 22, 1998, at 6A; see also, Frank Ching, China
Feels Let Down by U.S., FAR E. ECON. REv., Sept. 24, 1998, at 38.
89 See Barbara Crossette, Clinton Urges World Action on Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22,
1998, at A12.
90 See Steven Erlanger, Missile Strikes are Seen as New Strategy for U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 23, 1998, at A10.
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aggression which is a clear and blatant violation of the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of a Member State of the United Nations ....
The United States, on the other hand, staunchly defended its actions on
moral and legal grounds. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright proclaimed
that the United States "cannot allow such cowardly acts to go
unpunished. 92  Despite the retaliatory tone in Secretary Albright's
statement, the United States emphasized that the strikes were conducted
primarily as a pre-emptive measure against future acts being contemplated
by bin Laden's organization, and that "inaction would be an invitation to
further horror." 93 Some have argued that the attacks were conveniently
conducted at a time when the White House was embroiled by the Lewinsky
scandal, but the strong support President Clinton received from prominent
Congressional Republicans quieted those claims.
94
Arguments based solely on moral opinion backed by military strength,
however, are insufficient. The United States does indeed enjoy the
comforts of having a strong, technically superior military, but relying on
that fact alone portrays the United States as a thoughtless bully
inconsiderate of the boundaries of international law. The following
sections will discuss the applicable norms and how interpretations of these
norms must be adjusted in the present age due to the changing threats the
world faces.
B. Terrorism as an Act of War
Traditional notions of war bring to mind images of planes, tanks,
battleships, and uniformed troops acting under a unified, state-sponsored
command. Terrorism, on the other hand, does not operate through such
visible means. Terrorism employs many tactics that are illicit in nature,
91 Letter Dated 21 August 1998 from the Minister of State at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Sudan Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UNSCOR, Annex,
at 2, U.N. Doc. S/1998/786 (1998). It is important to note that condemnation against the
bombing in Sudan was more vocal than the bombing in Afghanistan. Afghanistan's Taliban
government was not recognized as a legitimate government by the U.N. at the time and as
such, protests by the Taliban may have fallen on unsympathetic ears. In retrospect, the
bombing in Sudan may have in fact been a tactical and strategic blunder by the United
States. There was no clear evidence that the plant was manufacturing a VX precursor. See,
e.g., A Case of Mistaken Identity?, ECONOMIST, Aug. 29, 1998. Although the United States
has not admitted that it made a mistake, it has unfrozen the assets of the plant's owner and
has reached a confidential settlement with him after he filed a $50 million lawsuit against the
United States. See, e.g., A Bit of Collateral Damage, ECONOMIST, Aug. 26, 2000, at 35.
92 Press briefing with Madeleine Albright and Sandy Berger, Aug. 20, 1998, Office of
the Press Secretary, The White House, at http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements
/1 998/980820.html [hereinafter Albright/Berger Briefing].
13 See id.
94 See generally Critics of Clinton Support Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, at Al.
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such as hijacking, murder, kidnapping, weapons smuggling, and drug
trafficking. Additionally, terrorist groups often operate in highly
fragmented clusters whose leadership and hierarchical structure is difficult
to discern.
Waging war against a non-state sponsored enemy is counter-intuitive
to most conceptions of war. Wars are typically fought between states, not
between a state and an individual or rogue band of terrorists. Yet with the
threat to many nations shifting from that posed by nuclear superpowers to
the threat of terrorist activity, it is necessary to consider the fight against
terrorism as a war rather than simply a law enforcement issue. Although
several countries, including the United States, have criminal statutes
addressing terrorism, 95 and there exist several international conventions that
have established a framework for criminalization of terrorist acts,96 these
statutes alone are ineffective in addressing the problem. Criminalizing
terrorism is an effective method of identifying specific acts that are
punishable, yet this does little to thwart terrorist activities and limits law
enforcement activity to operating in a reactive mode once a terrorist act has
taken place. Cooperation conflicts, different rules of evidence, search and
seizure standards and varying pre-trial procedures are just a few of the
obstacles that may stand in the way of effectively combating terrorism from
the viewpoint that it is just a crime, rather than an act of war.
Some authors support the suggestion that acts of terrorism should be
characterized as acts of war due to their destructive conse uences and the
threat they pose to national security and regional stability. Accordingly,
the process of combating terrorism should be viewed not as a law
enforcement activity, but as an ongoing war. Although the concept of
engaging in a war against non-state sponsored persons and organizations
admittedly confounds the historical understanding of a wartime adversary,
considering it as such may release victimized nations from certain
constraints that exist when treating terrorism simply as a crime. In addition,
this concept could allow for the exercise of more forceful measures that
might not be permissible under the rubric of law enforcement.
95 See Antiterrorism Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-519, 104 Stat. 2250 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 2331). See also Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act, 1998, c. 40
(Eng.); Crimes (Ships and Fixed Platforms) Act, 1992, No. 173 (Austl.). Many more
countries, surprisingly, do not have statutes specifically referring to terrorism, although their
criminal statutes may address some of the individual acts that are common among terrorist
activity.
96 See Joshua Black & Martin Skladany, Jr., The Capabilities and Limits of the United
States in Fighting Terrorism, Annex 1 (Apr. 10, 2000), at http://www.odc.org/conference/
confpapers/Terrorism%20Paper.doc.
97 See, e.g., Tim Butcher & Hugh Davies, U.S. Strike was 'First Blow in the War of the
Future,' WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1998, at Al [hereinafter First Blowl.
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For instance, although bin Laden is a key suspect in the Khobar
Towers bombings and the attack on the USS COLE, legal squabbling and a
lack of full cooperation from the Saudi and Yemeni governments have
hindered both investigations.98 Enough evidence existed to indict bin
Laden under U.S. law for the African embassy bombings and many other
acts.99 While it may be easy to get a criminal indictment against someone
in the United States (especially when terrorism is involved), the indictment
against bin Laden was the result of several years of intense investigation by
U.S. and foreign intelligence agencies. The trial of bin Laden's followers
begun in February 2001 in New York is lending further credence to the
evidence relied upon for the indictment.1t° The preliminary evidence that
supported the indictment of bin Laden should justify using force to rout him
out of the hills of Afghanistan.
The United States has defined its fight against terrorism as a war.''
Sara Scheideman has argued that the scope of this statement is too broad
because the recent attacks directed at the United States threatened "neither
[its] territorial integrity nor [its] political independence."' 10 2  This view,
however, relies on antiquated interpretations of legal norms and falls to
comprehend the changing nature of the world with respect to the multi-
national presence of many nations' citizens, corporations, and government
representatives. In other words, the "presence" of any particular nation can
extend beyond its borders, and this presence needs to be protected wherever
it exists. To be confined to the standard noted above would hobble the
United States' (or any other country pursuing a war against terrorism)
efforts at preventing further acts of terror when faced with uncooperative or
unwitting countries that may be hosting terrorists.
98 See, e.g., John F. Bums, Yemen Restricting F.B.I. Access to Suspects in Cole Bombing,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2000, at 10; see also John F. Bums, FBI and Yemen Said to be Near an
Agreement on Investigation of the Cole Blast, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2000, at A16; see also
Gary Fields & Neil King, Jr., U.S., Yemen Near a Deal on Probe of Ship Assault, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 2, 2000, at A23; see also What's News - Worldwide, "U.S. investigators are being
denied..., " WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2001, at Al.
99 See Indictment, United States v. Osama bin Laden, S(2) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS), (S.D.N.Y.
1998).
100 See, e.g., Carola Hoyos, Embassies Bombed to 'Drive Out U.S.,' FIN. TIMES, Feb. 6,
2001, at 8.
1O1 JEFFREY D. SIMON, THE TERRORIST TRAP: AMERICA'S EXPERIENCE WITH TERRORISM
166 (1st ed. 1994) (discussing a 1984 National Security Decision Directive enacted into law
under the Reagan administration that began a new policy of suppressing terrorism by using
forceful measures against terrorist targets even when they are outside the territorial
boundaries of the United States because they are considered a threat to national security).
See also First Blow, supra note 97 (quoting U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's
statement that terrorism is "the war of the future").
102 See, e.g., Sara N. Scheideman, Standards of Proof in Forcible Responses to Terrorism,
50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 249, 273 (2000).
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C. Distinctions Between State Sponsored and Non-State
Sponsored Terrorist Groups
When terrorist organizations are state-sponsored, their activities can be
hampered through sanctions against the sponsoring state and other methods
ratified by international organizations such as the United Nations. But
economic sanctions against a host nation rarely have a direct effect on non-
state sponsored terrorist organizations operating in that nation's territory.
The diplomacy and law enforcement options become moot when a nation is
faced with dealing with non-state sponsored terrorists. Accordingly, a
country that has fallen victim to such terrorism must adopt more extreme
measures in order to defend the rights of its citizens and its international
interests. The danger of failing to take such action is that a nation's
citizens, victimized by terrorism, may cower at the prospect of any
international presence and withdraw to the confines of their national
borders. The eventual (albeit dramatic) result could be that a nation whose
citizens retreat to their own boundaries may become economically and
politically isolated from the rest of the world - an unfortunate victory for
terrorism. Law enforcement options are usually initiated only after a
terrorist act has taken place. While it is certainly desirable to bring
terrorists to justice in an internationally recognized criminal forum, the
escalation of terrorist activity throughout the world sounds an urgent call
for nations to take action that would thwart terrorist acts and organizations
before they are committed.
There is evidence suggesting bin Laden has made efforts to develop
and use weapons of mass destruction such as chemical or biological
weapons. 0 3  This frightening realization requires an internationally
recognized standard that would allow pre-emptive actions by states who are
threatened with terrorist acts, regardless of whether those threats will be
carried out within their sovereign territory or against their citizens abroad.
Even the United States has had difficulty codifying a satisfactory
response to terrorism, and instead often tends to act in an "ad hoc and
fragmented '' °4 manner. Many of the nations who condemned the U.S.
bombings in Sudan and Afghanistan were fortunate enough to not have lost
any of their citizens in the African embassy bombings. But even though the
United States was the obvious target of those attacks, a relatively small
percentage of the victims were Americans; most in fact were Kenyan and
Tanzanian nationals.10 5 It should be apparent then, that while the aim of
103 See, e.g., What's News - Worldwide, "Embassy bombing jurors were told...," WALL
ST. J., Feb. 9, 2001, at Al.
104 Jennifer A. Rosenfield, The Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Bringing International
Terrorists to Justice the American Way, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 726, 733 n. 23
(1992). (criticizing the U.S. legislative response to acts of terrorism as "reactive, reflexive,
and haphazard").
1"5 See PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1998, supra note 3.
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terrorism may be specific, it does not discriminate against its collateral
victims, essentially making its practice a universal threat. As a U.S. Justice
Department official stated, "In a greater sense, all of the citizens of the
world are victims whenever and wherever... acts of international terrorism
strike.. .it is up to the authorities of the world to respond vigorously and
unrelentingly to such terrorist acts."
10 6
D. "Just War" Theory as Applied to the Fight Against
Terrorism
Scholars have debated what constitutes a "just war" for thousands of
years, dating at least as far back as the time of ancient Greece. 10 7 The
Romans, for instance, justified the use of force against their enemies abroad
as part of the "divine will. °10 8 The Roman theory relied on the premise that
order is a deterrent to force (presumably against the Roman state) and that
force threatens order; therefore, force must be quashed before disorder
occurs.'09 St. Augustine is another oft-cited just war theorist, whose
philosophy taught that wars for the purpose of aggression are unjust. "0
Several hundred years passed before the Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotius
introduced a new discourse on just war. Grotius' theory incorporated the
notion of self-defense as permissible when protecting N roperty and to
punish wrongs suffered by the citizens of a nation. This theory
eventually gave way to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which attempted
to develop a cohesive understanding for the appropriate use of force, with
stronger consideration given to state sovereignty. 112
Not unexpectedly, disagreements persisted, as evidenced by the
numerous religious wars throughout Europe, events in the early 19th century
and hostilities in 1914 that led to World War I. In 1920, as the world was
still trying to come to grips with the effects of the Great War, the League of
Nations was established, with the hope of binding states to a requirement to
resolve disputes through every available peaceful means rather than by
force. 1 3 Nine years later, forty-six nations ratified the Kellogg-Briand Pact
106 Larry Neumeister, U.S. Indicts bin Laden in Bombings, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov.
5, 1998, at IA.
107 See, e.g., Sebastian Junger, The Forensics of War, VANITY FAIR, Oct. 1999, at 144.
108 See, e.g., MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 777-78 (4th ed. 1997).
109 See id.
"10 See id.
11 See HUGO GROTIuS, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIS LIBRI TRES, Book I, Ch. I, § 11 (1646),
reprinted in 2 THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 172 (James Brown Scott ed., Francis
W. Kelsey trans., 1925).
112 See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 14 (1963).
113 See Byard Q. Clemmons & Gary D. Brown, Rethinking International Self-Defense:
The United Nations' Emerging Role, 45 NAVAL L. REV. 217, 230 (1998).
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in an effort to prohibit aggressive wars.1 14 The Kellogg-Briand Pact did
acknowledge self-defense as a justification for resorting to war, but its
drafters probably did not anticipate the severir of the current threat posed
by non-state sponsored terrorist organizations.
The Just War Doctrine is not a well-defined collection of laws relating
to war. Instead, it is a constantly changing tradition' 16 of norms, ideas, and
customs that have emerged over time to deal with the persistent
phenomenon of war. Debates about what constitutes an unjust war have
confounded countless scholars throughout the years and continue to do so
today. Noble earlier efforts, such as those of the League of Nations and the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, attempted to curb aggression as a means of resolving
disputes between nations. The basic tenets of the Kellogg-Briand Pact have
been incorporated into U.N. Article 33, which requires nations to attempt
resolution of disputes that may threaten international peace by exhausting
peaceful means such as "negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or
judicial settlement," rather than resorting to armed conflict.1 17
All of these treaties and pacts were drafted with the purpose of
quelling violence between nations. There remain some important
distinctions between the conflicts that arise between states and those that
arise between states and rogue terrorist organizations. Sovereign nations
have the opportunity to resolve their disputes through a variety of resolution
venues, ranging from the United Nations to privately sponsored panels. As
to conflicts between states and terrorist organizations, however, there are no
such bodies to address disputes, and, even if they existed, it is likely that
members of the terrorist organizations would scoff at the concept of
resolving differences civilly. Terrorist groups are simply not structured in a
manner that would make peaceful dispute resolution a feasible option. The
aim of many terrorist organizations is to force a change in policy through
violence rather than through civil dispute resolution procedures. As such,
aggressive use of force by a state victimized by terrorism is necessary to
bring such disputes to closure.
Under United States law, a President declaring war against another
nation was required to follow procedures set forth in the Constitution.!
18
114 See id. at 219.
115 See id.
116 The author acknowledges that the term "changing tradition" is an oxymoron. But in
the context that it is used in this Note, it seems appropriate.
117 U.N. CHARTER art. 33, reprinted in IAN BROWNLIE, BASIC DOCUMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (1967) [hereinafter BASIC DOCUMENTS].
118 See War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, H.R.J. Res. 542, 9 3rd Cong.
(1973). This resolution gives the President authority to deploy troops at his discretion for a
period of up to 90 days, without the approval of Congress or a formal declaration of war. If
the United States were to formally declare an ongoing war against terrorism, the President
could effectively act against terrorism immediately. Of course, that is what has actually
20021
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Waging a war against a non-state sponsored terrorist organization is
different. Currently, no "specific statutory authorization is necessary for
the President to take action against a terrorist or terrorist group unless the
strategy involves launching a large-scale aggressive war against another
sovereign state."11 9  The theory this Note proposes does not advocate
prolonged military activity in the territory of another nation. Rather, it
argues only for limited operations with the specific purpose of fighting
terrorists. Furthermore, it does not contemplate action against the armed
forces of the country in which the activity is taking place. Viewing
terrorism as an act of war rather than just a crime, and allowing aggressive
measures to prevent further acts would be a significant step toward
fostering such a vigorous response and would be in the best interests of the
world community.
E. The Necessity of Unilateral Action in the War Against
Terrorism
One of the criticisms of the U.S. strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan was
that not only was no approval sought, but that there was no notice given to
any other nation or international body before the strikes were carried out. E0
The potential consequences of this tight-lipped operation could have
resulted in misinterpretation by nearby countries that would escalate into a
situation more dire than that posed by terrorism alone. 121 Even after years
of valiant efforts by the international community to reach an agreement on
the appropriate measures needed to combat terrorism successfully, we are
still left with a collection of feeble institutions and conventions that prevent
an effective multilateral approach to combating the problem. As such, and
despite the aforementioned criticisms, the fight against terrorism will very
likely be a unilateral fight by victimized nations for several years to come.
Unilateral action has the potential to alienate other nations. For
instance, strikes against bin Laden's camp in Afghanistan (an Islamic
country) could be viewed as an expression of contempt toward Muslim
nations in general, potentially weakening key alliances in the Persian Gulf.
In addition, states that have had the fortune not to be direct victims of
been done in recent years, but formally declaring the fight against terrorism as a war would
provide a strong showing of support for the President's actions and the new norm proposed
herein.
119 See Robert F. Turner, Legal Responses to International Terrorism: Constitutional
Constraints on Presidential Power, 22 Hous. J. INT'L L. 77, 84 (1999). Professor Turner
defends a broad authority for the President to formulate and conduct foreign policy and
international affairs as he sees fit in circumstances in which the Constitution does not
otherwise clearly specify. Engaging in a war against terrorism would be one such example
of exercise of such broad authority.
120 See Allies Back U.S. Strikes, supra note 88.
121 See supra text accompanying note 87.
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terrorism or suffer collaterally as a result of anti-western sentiment have
little reason (or in many cases, capability) for joining in the fray.
Even organizations such as NATO are not a viable multilateral weapon
in the fight against terrorism. Article Five of NATO's Founding Charter'
22
addresses multilateral action against an aggressing adversary, but this
provision was developed with the threat of the Soviet Union lingering over
Europe's consciousness. In the post-Cold War era, with the Soviet threat
essentially eliminated, there is little rationale or incentive for NATO to
expand its anti-terrorism activity outside its scope. Although NATO has
expanded its role to address humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping
operations, it has still limited itself to doing so in the European theatre. 23
While the issue of fighting terrorism may eventually surface on NATO's
agenda, it will probably only be willing to address terrorism within its
territory. As France has argued, such "out-of-area operations"' 124 could
weaken NATO's "strategic doctrine and organizational structure."'
' 25
Because "terrorist networks lie outside the web of civil responsibility
that constrains"'126 the rest of the world, efforts such as international
sanctions against terrorist organizations are a futile gesture as well.
Although bin Laden's wealth is surely a key facilitator in his activities and
freezing his access to that wealth may inhibit future acts, he has most likely
hidden it in ways that are difficult, if not impossible, to reach.
127
Additionally, terrorists are not a legitimate part of an economic flow of
goods, capital, or resources, so sanctions in the usual sense serve only a
symbolic purpose.
International terrorism poses a greater threat to some countries than to
others. The countries that have been the primary targets of international
terrorism (such as the United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom) also
have the best available means to fight terrorism. Despite the overwhelming
122 See North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243,
246.
123 See generally John J. Merriam, Note, Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian
Intervention, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 111 (2001).
124 See Dov Waxman, Terrorism: The War of the Future, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.
201, 205 (Fall 1999).
125 See id.
126 See Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism, The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24
YALE J. INT'L L. 559 (1999).
127 On Aug. 20, 1998, President Clinton issued an Executive Order freezing the assets of
bin Laden and forbidding any transactions between U.S. companies and bin Laden's entities.
Although this was a wise policy choice by President Clinton, the effectiveness of this order
is debatable in light of the fact that bin Laden has surely concealed many of his assets
through various means. See Exec. Order No. 13,099, 3 C.F.R. 208 (1981), reprinted in 50
U.S.C. § 1701 (1998); see also Continuation of Emergency Regarding Terrorists Who
Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process, 64 Fed. Reg. 3,393 (1999).
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number of Kenyan and Tanzanian citizens who were killed in the embassy
bombings, neither has the means nor the incentive128 to tackle the terrorist
threat across the globe. On the other hand, as the last remaining military
'superpower,' the United States does have the means to fight terrorism on a
global scale. Further, the declaration of war against the United States and
its citizens provides a clear incentive to take action. Because of widespread
anti-American sentiment, often combined with violent activity, terrorism
poses a disproportionate threat to the United States and its citizens. This
threat can be countered, however, by the disproportionate military
advantage the United States can employ in fighting terrorism.
Finally, unilateral action is the most feasible course of action due to
the sensitivity and timeliness of such measures. Waiting for Security
Council approval or the permission of other nations for fly-through
authority could negate the effectiveness of a mission and jeopardize the
welfare of those conducting it. Although future strikes against terrorist
targets may continue to be unilateral actions or actions with only limited
assistance from other nations, other nations may begin to understand the
necessity of such action and support those nations who do take such
unilateral action.
F. Circumventing the Rule Against Assassination
This Note has argued that the concept of war should be expanded to
allow for engagements against non-state sponsored terrorists and their
organizations. But it has not addressed one of the unfortunate realities of
any war - the fact that people will die. Although the discussion thus far has
emphasized the need to prevent further terrorist activity, it has not
specifically stated how this will be accomplished. Quite simply, it means
that the most effective way to prevent terrorists such as bin Laden from
committing further acts is to kill them. Several months after the strikes in
Afghanistan and Sudan, the Clinton Administration acknowledged that one
of the "clear but unstated objectives" of the mission was to "kill Osama bin
Laden and as many of his lieutenants as possible." 129 The discussion of
assassination invokes strong opinions from both supporters and opponents
on legal, evidentiary, and moral grounds. Jeffrey Smith, a former general
counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency has noted the dilemma of
128 This is not to say that Kenya and Tanzania have no incentive to see an end to the bin
Laden terrorist network. As mentioned earlier, the majority of the victims of the bombings
were Kenyan and Tanzanian citizens. Both countries certainly have an interest in seeing bin
Laden and his followers brought to justice for the crimes they committed in August 1998.
The term "incentive" is used in this context to imply that Kenya and Tanzania are not
specific primary targets for international terrorism; therefore, they would likely not involve
themselves in a widespread fight against it.
129 See James Risen, Bin Laden was Target of Afghan Raid, U.S. Confirms, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 1998, at A3.
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fighting terrorism with questionably terrorist methods. Doing such could
potentially "undermine[] our role as a leader in respect for the rule of law
and respect for human rights."'3 ° Yet the killing of Osama bin Laden may
in fact be a necessary act in the global fight against terrorism.
In 1981, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12,333, which
states that "[no] person employed or acting on behalf of the United States
Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in assassination."'
131
The underlying theory behind the issuance of the Order was that
assassination is a term of art for the crime of murder, and no government
should sanction murder as an official foreign policy practice. Assassination
"is incompatible with American principle, international order, and
morality."'1 2  The Executive Order was intended, however, to apply in
situations where plots were being devised to kill foreign heads of state or
other high government officials of states hostile to the United States.'33
The Senate committee investigating the issue of assassination stopped
short of addressing the issue outside the context of peacetime operations,
leaving the debate open to consideration for actions during wartime.'34 The
Senate committee's avoidance of this issue provides a clear solution to the
terrorism problem. Declaring a legitimate war against individual terrorists
is the logical way around the assassination restriction. Bin laden is
certainly not a head of state; if anything, he is more akin to a field marshal
in a paramilitary organization. In a time of war, activities that may
otherwise be viewed as assassination are permissible because the "victim"
is actually a combatant.'
35
130 See Tim Weiner, Rethinking the Ban on Political Assassinations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
30, 1998, § WK3, at 3.
131 See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 213 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401
(1981). A similar Executive Order was issued by President Ford in 1976. See Exec. Order
No. 11,905, 3 C.F.R. 90, 101 (1976), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1976).
132 See Patricia Zengel, Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict, 43 MERCER L. REV.
615, 633 (1992).
133 See Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International
Law: Terrorism, Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REv. 89, 118-119 (1989)
(noting that President Ford issued the Order after the Senate investigative committee
implicated the C.I.A. in five assassination plots of several high-ranking foreign leaders).
134 See Zengel, supra note 132, at 633.
135 See W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12,333 and Assassination,
ARMY LAW., Dec. 1989, at 4. Parks notes that the Reagan Administration specifically chose
to exclude punitive raids against terrorists from the ban on assassinations, thus leaving that
avenue open for action.
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The plots that led to the assassination prohibition were motivated more
for political purposes than for purposes such as self-defense.'36 After
thorough consideration, the Clinton Administration supported an
interpretation of Executive Order 12,333 that would allow for an exception
to the perplexing situation posed by terrorists such as bin Laden: "The
clandestine.. .or overt use of force against legitimate targets in time of war,
or against similar targets in time of peace, where such individuals or
groups pose an immediate threat.. .does not constitute assassination."'
' 37
Assassination may be the only realistic possibility to prevent the threat
posed by terrorists. Although some may argue that such acts would only
further inflame the hatred of terrorists who would in turn retaliate more
viciously, this possibility must be weighed against the disruption the killing
of its leader would cause to a terrorist group. 38 Such disruption might lead
to decreased activity, or even a complete end to such acts by more
reasonably minded members.
Since bin Laden is not a head of state, the ban against assassination
should not be interpreted to apply to him. Viewing bin Laden as a
combatant, which necessarily entails accepting the notion that the United
States is engaged in an ongoing war against him, loosens the restrictions on
how to deal with him if just considered in a criminal context.139 There is no
indication that bin Laden intends to curtail his attacks on the United States
wherever he can do so. The lives of a select few who choose to mock
global peace and wreak terror around the world, killing thousands in the
process, should not be protected under any provision of law that inhibits or
prevents an international terrorist from being brought before an appropriate
tribunal.
136 See Sofaer, supra note 133, at 119; Jami Melissa Jackson, The Legality of
Assassination of Independent Terrorist Leaders: An Examination of National and
International Implications, 24 N.C. J. INT'L L & COM. REG. 669, 674 (1999).
137 See Paul Richter, White House Justifies Option of Lethal Force Policy, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 29, 1998, at AI (quoting a memorandum issued to the White House by the office of the
Army Judge Advocate General) (emphasis added).
138 See, e.g., The Consequences of Selective Killing, ECONOMIST, Aug. 4, 2001, at 40. See
also Milt Bearden, Death Penalty Would Hinder Anti-Terrorism, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2001,
at A22 (elaborating further, in the wake of the New York trial of bin Laden's lieutenants,
the dilemma of whether to administer the death penalty to convicted terrorists and
suggesting that the death penalty will be a deterrent to anti-terrorist efforts, and would
exacerbate the ire of terrorists).
139 The status of "combatant" recognizes no rank hierarchy. For example, during World
War II, the United States attacked a Japanese plane knowing that one of its passengers was
Admiral Yamamoto. See Sofaer, supra note 133, at 121.
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IV. BREAKING THE SHACKLES: EXPANDING INTERPRETATIONS OF
EXISTING DOCTRINES
When the United States conducted the strikes in Afghanistan and
Sudan, it did not do so with the "ad hoc and fragmented" approach it had
been accused of in the past when dealing with terrorist acts. Instead, it
carefully reviewed existing legal authorities, including the U.N. charter, as
well as the potential repercussions and the feasibility of such actions. 14°
Much of the criticism directed toward the United States after their cruise
missile strikes was based on differing interpretations of the same
authorities. Since the threat of international terrorism still looms heavily
over the world, it is inevitable that more catastrophic acts will occur in the
future and responses similar to the U.S.' in 1998 will be contemplated by
the victims of those terrorist acts. Understanding the current interpretations
of some of the authorities as well as the need to expand their applicability in
light of situations not anticipated when they were developed is necessary in
order to justify the concept of engaging in war against terrorists within
another nation's territory.
A. The Caroline Doctrine
The crux of the U.S.'s argument defending its actions in Afghanistan
and Sudan was that it was acting in self-defense against imminent (albeit
unspecific) future attacks by bin Laden's organization. 4  The foundation
of the self-defense argument can be found in what is known as "The
Caroline Doctrine," embodied in an 1837 statement by then U.S. Secretary
of State Daniel Webster. 42 Webster stated that self-defense should only be
exercised in extraordinary circumstances where the "necessity of self-
defense is instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no
140 See Albright/Berger Briefing, supra note 92.
141 See id.
142 In 1837, Canada was in the midst of rebellions against British rule. The U.S.
government adopted a neutral position in the matter, but some U.S. citizens actively
supported the Canadian cause. In December 1837, a privately owned U.S. steamboat, The
Caroline, departed from Buffalo, New York loaded with supplies to be delivered to the
Canadian rebels. Although the first shipment reached its destination, the British military
commander ordered his naval forces to destroy the Caroline to prevent further deliveries to
the Canadians. Carrying out this order, British forces entered American territory, sending
the Caroline plunging over Niagara Falls. Two crewmembers of the Caroline were killed in
the assault. The British Ambassador, Henry Fox, justified the destruction of the Caroline on
the grounds of self-defense. Daniel Webster opposed this argument and set forth his
interpretation of a legitimate exercise of self-defense, now known as "The Caroline
Doctrine." Ironically enough, the United States now finds itself deviating from Webster's
definition and adopting an approach more similar to that, which the British adopted. See,
e.g., Alberto R. Coil, The Legal and Moral Adequacy of Military Responses to Terrorism, 81
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 297, 307 (1987).
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moment for deliberation." 143 The Caroline Doctrine has come to stand as
the foundation for the customary law of self-defense, establishing three
essential requirements: necessity, proportionality, and immediacy.
44
Critics claim that terrorist acts do not meet the Webster standard145 that
actions like the U.S.'s were simply retaliatory, and that the Caroline
Doctrine does not allow for acts of anticipatory self-defense.'46
Critics who assert such claims fail to consider the significant changes
in military capability and terrorist activity that have occurred in the 160
years since the Caroline Doctrine was established. To rely on the doctrine
simply as it was enunciated in 1837 would be to take on a myopic
interpretation that is ungrounded in the reality the world faces today. The
fact that Afghanistan has been uncooperative and that it is already subject to
numerous sanctions by individual nations and international organizations
has rendered any alternative to using military efforts against bin Laden
ineffective, thus satisfying the "necessity" requirement of the Caroline
Doctrine.
The unconventional methods of destruction used in terrorism make the
proportionality requirement difficult to quantify. In traditional warfare,
proportionality would be defined along the lines of fighting an adversary
with similar weapons systems. For example, fighting tanks with tanks and
supporting airfare or artillery would be proportionally adequate whereas
fighting tanks with nuclear warheads would clearly be disproportionate. A
completely literal interpretation of proportionality is unrealistic in the
terrorism context since it is unlikely that the United States will park an
explosive-rigged truck outside bin Laden's headquarters. The Caroline
Doctrine's proportionality requirement when fighting terrorism can best be
met when considering the overall intent of each party. For terrorists, the
goal is the radical transformation of their target's foreign policy or simply
the death of the target's citizens, while for the victim nation it is the end of
terrorist activity. The 'proportionality' used by a nation fighting terrorism
should be that activity which is sufficient to destroy terrorist facilities
(which a few well targeted cruise missiles should accomplish).
Finally, the notion of immediacy needs to be more broadly interpreted.
Under some standards of immediacy, the United States would have to wait
until it had concrete proof of an imminent attack on a specific target before
taking action. Terrorism's unpredictability and the secrecy with which
143 See Robert F. Teplitz, Taking Assassination Attempts Seriously: Did the United States
Violate International Law in Forcefully Responding to the Iraqi Plot to Kill George Bush?,
28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 569, 577 (1995).
144 See generally YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE 230 (1988).
145 See, e.g., James P. Rowles, Military Responses to Terrorism, 81 Am. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 287, 314 (1987).
146 See, e.g., Chris A. Anderson, Note, Assassination, Lawful Homicide, and the Butcher
of Baghdad, 13 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 291, 299 (1992).
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many terrorists conduct their pre-attack operations make it virtually
impossible to pinpoint and prevent specific attacks. Bin Laden's general
declaration of war against the United States and its citizens and facilities
overseas before the African embassy bombings and the subsequent acts he
is connected to are reasonable grounds to assume that there are ongoing
efforts to commit further attacks. This should be sufficient to meet the
immediacy requirement. Otherwise, the United States and other victims of
terrorism will be forced to wring their hands in anticipation of pending
attacks. Victim nations may find themselves on the brink of complete
destruction at the hands of terrorists before they can justifiably act under a
strict interpretation of "immediacy." Such limitations are not only perilous
to the welfare of the international community, but also give terrorists the
freedom to operate behind an unreasonable and excessively restrictive legal
norm.
B. United Nations Charter Article 51
While the Caroline Doctrine is an effective springboard from which to
form a basis of defense for adopting a hard-line stance against terrorism, it
has not formally been codified into any national or international standards.
Article 51147 of the United Nations Charter, however, does incorporate
theories similar to the Caroline Doctrine. Unfortunately, narrow
interpretations and failure to address situations unanticipated at the time of
its inception have rendered Article 51 an obstacle rather than a catalyst in
the fight against terrorism. The primary question regarding Article 51 in
the context of the situation presented here is whether the self-defense
doctrine should be more broadly construed to include acts of anticipatory
self-defense against non-state sponsored terrorists operating within the
sovereign territory of a third-party country. Because of the changing
dynamics of warfare and terrorism - situations that may not have been
anticipated at the time Article 51 was drafted - it is necessary that the
doctrine allow for this broader interpretation. 148
The United Nations appears to have contradicted itself when
confronting the issue of combating international terrorism. The Security
147 U.N. CHARTER art. 51, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 117, at 16. This
article states: "Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."
148 A broader interpretation may only be the beginning, however. Article 51 should in
fact be formally amended to address the new dynamic posed by terrorism and incorporate
some of the arguments set forth in this Note.
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Council has stated that "suppression of acts of international terrorism" is
"essential for the maintenance of international peace and security" and has
asked its member nations to "adopt...effective and practical measures for
security cooperation, for the prevention of such acts of terrorism, and for
the prosecution and punishment of their perpetrators."'' 49 This language in
itself would appear to justify actions such as the U.S. has taken in the past.
Surprisingly, that has not been the case.
Article 51 recognizes a nation's inherent right to use self-defense "if
an armed attack occurs against a Member."'' 5°  Additionally, Article 51
permits unilateral action by a victimized nation.' 1 The United Nations is
rightfully wary of potential abuses of the rights inherent under Article 51
and has established four standards to prevent nations from abusing those
rights. 52 These standards, however, are overly inhibitive and appear not to
have anticipated the current threat posed by terrorism. The narrowness of
these standards actually may have the effect of enabling terrorists to hide
behind a wall of unreasonably binding international laws.
First, Article 51 only allows actions taken in self-defense. The strikes
in Afghanistan and Sudan were viewed by many as retaliatory acts. 53
Armed reprisals by victimized states are not looked upon favorably by the
United Nations. 15  Some would argue that they are "more punitive than
protective" and that, in the case of the African embassy bombings, the
threat subsided once the smoke settled and the United States response was
therefore unwarranted. 55
Under this view, in order for a nation to defend itself, it would have to
be under attack at the moment it was exercising its right of self-defense.
Reactions to attacks committed in the past would not be permitted, no
"9 S.C. Res. 1189, U.N. SCOR, 3915th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 189 (1998)
(emphasis added).
150 U.N. CHARTER art. 51, reprinted in BASic DOCUMENTS, supra note 117, at 16.
151 id.
152 See Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of
Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 537, 540-41 (1999).
153 See Crossette, supra note 89 (enumerating Kofi Annan's diplomatically veiled yet
plainly condemnatory criticism of the United States' unilateral action).
154 U.N. CHARTER art. 2(3), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 117, at 4. This
Article states: "All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in
such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." The
text of this article makes it clear that it was written with the expectation that conflicts would
arise only between legitimate states, not between one U.N. member state and a rogue
terrorist organization. Additionally, it makes the assumption that tactful negotiations can
occur between two conflicted parties. Osama bin Laden has not shown any indication that
he is willing to arbitrate any resolution with the United States, and even in the unlikely event
that he did, the enormity of his crimes would negate any bargaining power he may have.
155 See, e.g., Scheideman, supra note 102, at 273.
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matter how recently they occurred. Considering that terrorist attacks,
despite potentially lengthy planning, last but for a few moments, adhering
to this standard is nearly impossible. Additionally, terrorism occurs in a
wide variety of locales. In order to adequately meet the U.N. standard of
self-defense, forces would have to be assembled in close proximity to a
terrorist headquarters in one location, patiently waiting for a terrorist act to
occur somewhere else before getting the green light to exercise the self-
defense right. Such stringent requirements are unfeasible and dangerously
prohibitive, and have the effect of giving terrorists a 'head start' in
conducting their activities.
Second, the self-defense doctrine is limited to "substantial military
attacks," while "isolated armed incidents" do not meet the threshold
required for action. 156  This too is an overly restrictive interpretation.
Terrorism, by its sheer nature, depends on such "isolated" incidents to
achieve its goals. The fragmented nature of most terrorist organizations
makes it virtually impossible for the organizations to conduct anything
other than small-scale acts. When viewed individually, many of the
incidents to which Bin laden is linked do appear to be isolated armed
incidents. When viewed cumulatively, however, as a broader view of the
self-defense doctrine should allow, the danger of the overall threat posed by
terrorism becomes increasingly more apparent.
The third inhibiting standard of Article 51 relates to the complicity of a
nation hosting terrorist organizations. This standard allows for an attacked
state to strike at terrorist camps located in another state only if the terrorists
were state agents or sponsored in some other way by the host state
government. Although there is no evidence that Afghanistan has such
control over bin Laden or directly sponsors him in any other way, its
complicit attitude has certainly enabled him to continue with his agenda.
This essentially amounts to Afghanistan mocking the security of the world
community while bin Laden enjoys the relative security this standard grants
him.
Finally, the Charter requires that acts of self-defense be committed
only when threats are widespread and imminent, 157 which would preclude
acts of anticipatory self-defense without further proof of imminence. As
stated earlier, this standard would unreasonably confine nations to narrow
and unpredictable windows of opportunity that could seldom be exploited.
156 Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. 1, 93-99. In this case, the International Court
of Justice asserted a restrictive view of self-defense. The Court acknowledged that
Nicaragua had supplied arms and training to El Salvadoran rebels over the course of several
years but the justices determined that this activity did not rise to the level of "aggression"
and "assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other
support" and thus were not actions that would trigger the self-defense right.
157 See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv.
1620, 1633-34 (1984).
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A former State Department legal advisor has argued against such a
restrictive theory, stating that "self-defense allows a proportionate response
to every use of force, not just armed attacks."'' 58 It has been suggested that
the drafters of Article 51 may have only contemplated large scale, massive
attacks when they developed the requirement of 'armed attack.' 159
Although the United States received support from many of its allies
after the bombings in Afghanistan and Sudan, the significant number of
critics puts the United States on the defensive when justifying its actions.
As a signatory to the U.N. Charter, the United States has bound itself to the
U.N.'s laws. Yet the U.S. interpretation of the U.N. Charter, specifically
Article 51, varies from that of other member states. The U.S. interpretation
of Article 51 allows for three types of self-defense: (1) self-defense against
an actual use of force or hostile act; (2) preemptive self-defense against an
imminent use of force; and (3) self-defense against a continuing threat.' 6
Osama bin Laden and his henchmen have certainly committed hostile acts
against the United States. His continued at-large status combined with his
declaration to commit further acts of violence are a continuing threat that
the United States can justifiably defend against. U.N. member states
opposed to this broader interpretation should be mindful that actions by bin
Laden could occur within their territory, embroiling them in this ugly battle
against terrorism.
Continuing to look at strikes against terrorist targets simply as
retaliatory actions or unjustly preemptive is to turn a blind eye to the new
mode of terrorism. Such a philosophy is a hindrance to the effort of saving
innocent lives that may otherwise fall victim to terrorism. In an address
following the African embassy bombings, U.S. Secretary of Defense
William Cohen stated that "[we] have a choice: fight or fold in pathetic
cowardice.... ,,16 One week after that statement, the United States made it
clear that it would choose the former of the two options. This choice is not
only morally sound, but legally supportable under what should be a
universally recognized interpretation of the Caroline Doctrine and Article
51 that takes into consideration the changing dynamics of the world today.
158 See Sofaer, supra note 133, at 93-94.
159 See Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense: A Call to
Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 10 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 25, 42 (1987).
160 See Boyd M. Johnson, Executive Order 12,333: The Permissibility of an American
Assassination of a Foreign Leader, 25 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 401, 420 (1992).
161 Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Remarks at the Council of Foreign Relations
(Sept. 14, 1998), at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep1998/b09141998 bt475-98.html.
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C. The "Active Defense" and "Accumulation of Events"
Constructions of Article 51
Former Secretary of State George Schultz has provided a logical and
sound expanded construction of Article 51 in what is described as an
"active defense." Arguing that the "passive defense"'' 62 permitted in Article
51 is an insufficient deterrent to terrorism, Schultz stated that:
...our responses should go beyond passive defense to consider means of
active prevention, preemption, and retaliation. Our goal must be to
prevent and deter future terrorist attacks, and.. .one of the best deterrents
to terrorism is the certainty that swift and sure measures will be taken
against those who engage in it... Ouraim is not to seek revenge but to put
an end to violent attacks against innocent people.. .Clearly the
democracies have a moral right, indeed a duty, to defend themselves.
63
Another view that should be considered in allowing for a broader
interpretation of Article 51 is the "accumulation of events" theory adopted
by Israel. This theory was first proposed in 1985 after Israel bombed a
Palestinian Liberation Organization camp in Tunisia. 164 Israel's argument
was that repeated and unpredictable terrorist attacks were sufficient to
establish a self-defense claim under Article 51. The United Nations
Security Council rejected this theory and condemned the attack, claiming
that it appeared to be more of a reprisal against the murder of several Israeli
citizens in Syria one week prior and that Israel did not provide any evidence
that the PLO was responsible for those killings. 65 The United States
abstained from the Security Council vote, but the U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations issued a statement of support for Israel in the debates prior
to the vote.' 66 The situation the United States faces with bin Laden can be
distinguished from the Israeli bombing in Tunisia in that the United States
has provided a plethora of evidence linking bin Laden to many terrorist
attacks against it. Whether or not there is a retaliatory intent, the thorough
162 George Schultz, Terrorism: The Challenge to the Democracies, Address before the
Jonathan Institute's Conference on International Terrorism (June 24, 1984), in DEP'T ST.
BULL., Aug. 1984, at 31, 33.
163 George Schults, Terrorism and the Modem World, Address before the Park Avenue
Synagogue (Oct. 25, 1984), in DEP'T ST. BuLL., Dec. 1984, at 12, 16 (emphasis added).
164 For a more thorough description of this event and the legal debates following it, see
Wallace F. Warriner, The Unilateral Use of Coercion Under International Law: A Legal
Analysis of the United States Raid on Libya on April 14, 1986, 37 NAVAL L. REV. 49, 67
(1988).
165 See id. at 67-68.
166 See id. at 49-50. Ambassador Vernon Walter stated that the U.S. "strongly supports
the principle that a State subjected to continuing terrorist attacks may respond with
appropriate use of force to defend itself against further attacks."
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evidence provides a sufficient foundation for responding to such an
accumulation of events.
Anti-western and anti-Semitic sentiments have made the United States
and Israel prime targets for terrorist acts. Both nations have traditionally
responded quickly and forcefully to such acts, despite criticism from other
nations, most of who have enjoyed the luxury of not being constant victims
of terrorist attacks. As more countries find themselves caught up (directly
or indirectly) in the hateful sentiments of terrorists, it is likely that the
aggressive military responses will be looked to as the accepted norm rather
than a scorned deviation from international principles of justice.
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter emphasizes that using force as a self-
defense measure should only apply to situations where a State's "territorial
integrity or political independence" is threatened.167  This ignores the
obligation a country has to protect its overseas embassies, military facilities
and vessels, and citizens abroad. An attack on such targets should be
treated just as if it were committed within a nation's boundaries and should
be responded to with equal vigor. The right to protect these targets should
also include an allowance for limited military action in the territory of
another nation.
V. JUSTIFYING TERRITORIAL INTRUSIONS
The preceding sections have laid the foundation for the following
controversial claim advanced in this Note: in order to conduct the war
against terrorism, limited violations of another nation's sovereignty should
be allowed. The conflict becomes apparent when one considers that
terrorism in its many forms is doubtless a violation of the rule of law, but
that one of the most feasible ways to combat it, namely, violating another
state's sovereignty, is also a violation of the rule of law. It then becomes a
matter of fighting fire with fire. Just as any Forestry Service employee can
attest, a controlled burning is sometimes the best way to prevent accidental
forest fires. 168 In this instance, limited violations of sovereignty will be the
'controlled burning' that will prevent the spread of terrorism.
Assuming that the concepts of self-defense proposed above are
generally accepted, there is still a concern that carrying out the act of self-
defense against a non-state sponsored terrorist organization must ultimately
occur within the territory of another nation, a prima facie violation of
principles of sovereignty. This section will argue that pre-emptive self-
167 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2(3), reprinted in BASic DOCUMENTS, supra note 117, at 4. See
infra Section VI.
168 See, e.g., God, Man, and the Fires, ECONOMIST, Aug. 12, 2000, at 24-25. Of course,
based on the 'controlled burnings' initiated by the Forestry Service in the southwest United
States in the fall of 2000 which got out of hand, resulting in millions of dollars of property
damage, this may not be the best analogy. For the sake of the argument presented here,
however, it adequately illustrates the point, notwithstanding the Forestry Service's blunder.
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defense is a legitimate reason for entering another nation's territory and that
sovereignty of a third party country should not be an effective shield for a
terrorist to hide behind when confronted with the possibility of military
action; or as Abraham Sofaer put it, "territorial integrity is not entitled to
absolute deference in international law."'169 Regardless of the support or
control exercised over a terrorist organization, "countries that persistently
host terrorists have no right to be safe havens."'
170
A. The Necessity of Preemptive Self-Defense
With the threat to world stability shifting from large-scale assaults
contemplated under a cold-war scenario to sporadic and unpredictable
terrorist activity, the conception of appropriate methods of self-defense
must be broadened to include pre-emptive self-defense. F.B.I. Director
Louis Freeh has stated that bin Laden and his followers pose "about as
serious and imminent a threat as I can imagine."'171 As discussed above, the
current prevailing interpretation of the self-defense doctrine under Article
51 is dangerously restrictive in that it serves to prevent pre-emptive strikes
against terrorists. It should be enough to assume that further strikes are
imminent based on the clear language of bin Laden's fatwa. Requiring
victimized states to wait for an unfortunate reminder every so often will
only result in further lives lost and is in fact an indication of irresponsible
and cowardly leadership on behalf of the nations who condemn action such
as the type the United States took in August 1998.
The fact that terrorist organizations are amassing weapons and other
tools of destruction should be reason enough for striking against them, even
before they specify a target. While there are obvious legitimate reasons for
states to acquire weaponry, terrorist organizations have no such legitimacy.
The simple attempt by terrorists to acquire weapons 172 should be a prima
facie indication of their hostile intent and should be responded to swiftly
169 See Sofaer, supra note 133, at 106.
170 Presidential Address to the Nation on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in
Afghanistan and Sudan, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1643, 1644, available at
http://www.access.government/nara/nara003.htm] (Aug. 20, 1998) (Remarks by President
Clinton) [hereinafter Address to the Nation].
171 Senators Ask Legality of Assassinating Suspected Terrorists, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Sept. 4, 1998, at 13A.
172 The issue of which weapons constitute a significant threat can be hotly debated;
witness the ongoing arguments in the United States regarding proposals to ban handguns or
assault weapons. In regard to international terrorists, there is a broad range between
weapons that are not a significant threat (at least in a grander scale) such as knives or small
arms, and those that are clearly a major threat such as chemical and biological weapons. So,
in determining whether a particular weapon system in the hands of a terrorist is of such a
threat that immediate military action is necessary to suppress its use, perhaps it may be
appropriate to resort to Justice Stewart's fall back, "I'll know it when I see it."
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and violently. Allowing for a pre-emptive right of self-defense will send
the message to terrorists that they have no safe havens and that they will be
held culpable for the acts they have committed or are contemplating.
There is a possibility that, in some cases, pre-emptive strikes may be
ineffective. The evidentiary requirements that would trigger a pre-emptive
strike may not be as rigorous as would be required for a criminal
conviction, but that should not be a complete bar to allowing such strikes.
To require a level of evidence commensurate with that found in typical
criminal cases would unrealistically burden the intelligence agencies that
collect valuable information. While a typical criminal investigation occurs
after a crime has been committed and the perpetrators have fled, leaving the
crime scene a relatively benign location, the collection of information
pinpointing terrorist activity is usually done covertly, with the lives of those
gathering it constantly in peril. As such, evidence is gathered on a 'best
effort' basis and the credibility of such evidence usually needs to be taken
at face value.
Some writers have argued that allowing lesser degrees of proof for the
type of action proposed than that required for a criminal prosecution is
foolhardy. 173 Nonetheless, the United States did have "reasonable certainty
and direct evidence"'' 74 of bin Laden's involvement in the embassy
bombings. The critics who argue that the missile strikes that followed were
a "swift" response 75 ignore the fact that bin Laden had secretly been
indicted prior to the embassy bombings based on a thorough investigation
of several years. 176  President Clinton diplomatically addressed the
unrealistic expectation suggested above that exacting standards of proof are
necessary and that swift responses are imprudent:
[Tlhere have been and will be times when law enforcement and
diplomatic tools are simply not enough, when our very national security is
challenged, and when we must take extraordinary steps to protect the
safety of our citizens. With compelling evidence that the bin Laden
network of terrorist groups was planning to mount further attacks against
Americans and other freedom-loving people, I decided America must
act. 1
77
Sara Scheideman suggests two questions that policy makers should ask
when considering a forcible response to terrorism. First, "[w]hat evidence
is there that the suspects committed the act or acts of terrorism in issue?"'
178
The secret indictment combined with evidence gained through the
173 See Lobel, supra note 152, at 551.
174 See id.
171 See id. at 552.
176 See, e.g., Indictment, U.S. v. Osama bin Laden, supra note 99.
177 Address to the Nation, supra note 170, at 1643.
178 See Scheideman, supra note 102, at 282.
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cooperation of Kenyan and Nigerian law enforcement officials pointed the
finger at bin Laden. Second, "[w]hat evidence is there that the national
security will be put in jeopardy if force is not used?" 179  Although bin
Laden has not been linked to any terrorist acts committed within the United
States, inaction in the face of attacks against U.S. overseas facilities and
citizens erodes the credibility of the United States among its international
counterparts. Concepts of national security should not be confined to the
territorial boundaries of a nation but should instead encompass the idea of
international security and credibility. For instance, if U.S. forces were
driven from the Persian Gulf region because of the threat of terrorism, our
allies there would be left with little protection from hostile neighbors and
such a conflict could have serious global ramifications.
The bombings in Sudan and Afghanistan may at first glance have
appeared to be retaliatory, but when giving consideration to the overall
spectrum of events, it should be clear that they were in fact a part of the
long-term battle against the unpredictable but imminent threat of
terrorism. 80
B. Validating Intrusions on Sovereignty
Failing to allow a victimized nation to pursue terrorists operating
within the territory of another country "would render a victim state
powerless to preempt planned attacks before damage is sustained."
1 81
Three assumptions are necessary to support the argument in favor of
allowing intrusions into the territory of another nation. First, the host
nation must not be an actual sponsor of the terrorist or organization but
instead must be a complicit actor.' 82 International law provisions make it a
crime for a state to tolerate terrorist activity conducted within its borders,
even when not actively sponsoring it, so Afghanistan is not completely
faultless in the current scenario. 183 Nor are they without liability. The 1951
179 See id.
'go For a more thorough description of the United States' long-term plan to combat
terrorism, see William S. Cohen & General Henry H. Shelton, DoD News Briefing (August
20, 1998), at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Augl998/t08201998 t820brfg.html.
181 See Scheideman, supra note 102, at 251.
182 Active sponsorship by the host nation would make them culpable for acts committed
by the terrorist organization and would essentially qualify as an act of war by that nation.
The use of the term "host" should not be construed to mean that that country is actively
supporting terrorism.
183 See, e.g., Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 2, §
6, Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/1 858,
reprinted in [1951] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 135, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1951/Add.1
(providing that states have a duty not to tolerate terrorist activities designed to carry out
aggression in another state); see also Neil King, Jr., U.S. Pressures Taliban Over Cole
Attack, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2000, at A28 (quoting State Department counter-terrorism
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Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, drawn
up by the International Law Commission, determined that the harboring or
direct sponsoring of terrorism can be interpreted as an act of "indirect
aggression. 1 84 Second, the country that will conduct the limited incursion
into the host country must have exhausted the possible legal solutions such
as cooperation with extradition treaties or having the host nation try the
terrorist under their laws. Essentially, no option other than the use of force
must exist. Third, the victimized state must have sufficient evidence that
the proposed target is a legitimate military target and that collateral damage
to property and citizens of the host nation will be minimal or non-existent.
Adhering to these principles would prevent "the potential for abuse of the
right of self-defense and for the indiscriminate violation of state
sovereignty."'
8 5
Alberto Coll presents a potential paradox between the issues of
security and sovereignty: "A world in which terrorists refrain from
threatening innocent human beings with destruction... is as important an
objective of international law and as conducive to genuine international
legal order as one in which states scrupulously respect each other's formal
sovereignty."'' 86  Although acts such as military strikes against terrorist
camps, kidnapping terrorist leaders,' 87 or assassinating terrorist leaders may
be illegal under current international laws, moral justification could make
them tolerable and allow for an emergence into customary international
law.18
8
There are other principles of international law that deserve protection
as much as the principle of sovereignty of an independent nation. When
faced with the threat of continuing acts of terrorism against their overseas
chief, Michael Sheehan referring to Afghanistan as "a haven of lawlessness, in which
terrorists.. .live with impunity").
184 Yehuda Z. Blum, The Legality of State Response to Acts of Terrorism, in
TERRORISM: HOW THE WEST CAN WIN 134-37 (Benjamin Netanyahu ed., 1986)
(detailing how states have justified reprisal attacks under international law).
185 See Maureen F. Brennan, Avoiding Anarchy: Bin Laden, Terrorism, The U.S.
Response, and The Role of Customary International Law, 59 LA. L. REV. 1195, 1209
(1999).
186 Coil, supra note 142, at 306.
187 The U.S. Supreme Court has actually legalized the practice of extra-territorial
abduction. See Michael G. McKinnon, United States v. Alvarez-Machain: Kidnapping in the
War on Drugs - A Matter of Executive Discretion or Lawlessness?, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 1503
(1993), for an analysis of the 1990 kidnapping of Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain by U.S.
DEA agents. While the possibility of abducting bin Laden should not be completely
dismissed, the success of such an operation must be weighed against the possible results of a
failed mission (e.g., Desert One; the failed attempt at rescuing the U.S. hostages in Iran in
1980).
188 See Coil, supra note 142.
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facilities and citizens abroad, potential victim nations must consider their
responsibilities to those who would be harmed by such acts of terrorism.
Nations such as the United States, Israel, or the United Kingdom, which
have more sophisticated means to combat terrorism, may in fact owe a duty
to the international community, not just their own citizens, in combating
terrorism. Failing to allow limited violations of sovereignty would serve
''as a means of undercutting the capacity of free nations to act against
[terrorists].' ' 89 For the sake of international security, the current barriers
that prevent violations of sovereignty must be taken down.
The issue of limited rights of sovereignty has most recently been tested
in the realm of human rights violations in the Kosovo conflict of 1999. In
that situation, it was asserted that "a government that engages in substantial
violations of human rights betrays the very purpose for which it exists and
so forfeits not only its domestic legitimacy, but its international legitimacy
as well."'190 Along the same line then, nations who disregard the laws of
other nations while turning a blind eye to terrorists operating within their
boundaries should not be able to claim immunity under the privilege of the
law of nations.
At first glance, it might appear that the United States is imposing its
will over a weaker country if it conducted a war against bin Laden's forces
in Afghanistan. There are, however, several important considerations this
argument ignores. First, the United States is a signatory to many
antiterrorist treaties that oblige signatories to extradite terrorists or
prosecute them under their own laws. 91 Second, absent extradition, the
United States could try persons who commit acts of international terror
abroad within the U.S. court system based on the fact that terrorism can be
considered a universal crime, punishable under the laws of any state that
apprehends a terrorist.' 92 Afghanistan's only attempt at cooperation with
the United States has been a shallow statement that it would consult with its
189 See Sofaer, supra note 133, at 89.
190 Merriam, supra note 123, at 116 (citing FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW AND MORALITY 15-16 (2nd ed., 1997)).
191 See JOHN F. MURPHY, PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS: THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY INITIATIVES (1985), for a listing of antiterrorism conventions: The
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T.
1643, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; The Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons,
Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; The
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No.
11081, 19 I.L.M. 33; and The International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20
(1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
192 See generally Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 36.
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ulema as to whether bin Laden has violated any Islamic law. 93 The United
States should not expect any productive results to come from this "review."
Afghanistan's inaction thus leaves no other option but to use force to go
after bin Laden within Afghanistan's territory.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A. Universal Justice or American Bullying?
Abraham Sofaer has argued that violations of territorial integrity, even
when conducted with the intent of preventing further terrorist acts, are
"synonymous with imperialism."' 94 This argument may be especially
strong when considering that the countries most able to carry out such
violations of sovereignty are limited to a handful having the most high-tech
weaponry at their disposal. The nations whose sovereignty is often
violated, on the other hand, are often those who are least able to defend
themselves against such an act. Imagine a reversal of the present situation,
in which Afghanistan launched cruise missiles against a site in the United
States suspected of harboring terrorists who had perpetrated acts against
Afghani citizens abroad. Fortunately, Afghanistan lacks the military
capability to carry out such an act, but if an attempt were made, the United
States would surely respond against Afghanistan with military action,
regardless of the justification for Afghanistan's actions.
Afghanistan is not the only country that is at odds with the United
States, however. Consider the following hypothetical, but possibly more
realistic scenario, involving the U.S.'s closest hostile neighbor. Suppose
the two Czech nationals who were recently detained in Cuba for allegedly
stirring anti-Castro/Communist sentiments had escaped to Miami, but not
before they were able to finance and inspire enough Cuban citizens to
attempt an overthrow of Castro's regime. Suppose further that Cuban
forces had been able to quell this violence, but that several soldiers had
been killed in the process. Cuba angrily demands the extradition of the
two, but their demands are ignored by the United States. The U.S.'s only
response to Cuba is that it will consider whether the Czechs actually
violated any laws and, if so, will try them under U.S. law. Realizing that a
solution in its favor is unlikely, Cuba sends a hit squad into Little Havana in
Miami to kill the Czechs. The hit squad succeeds in accomplishing its
mission, but in the process, one American citizen is killed and an American
owned store is destroyed. Cuba acknowledges that the hit squad was acting
under its authority. What result for Cuba?
193 See, e.g., Afghans May Hand Over bin Laden, supra note 81.
194 See Sofaer, supra note 133, at 106.
195 See, e.g., Cuba's Last Political Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2001.
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B. Guidelines for Allowing Intrusions into Another Nation's
Territory
Even if these new norms are accepted, a victimized nation that does
intrude onto another nation's sovereignty will be thoroughly scrutinized by
the world community. In order to address the potential weaknesses in the
arguments advanced throughout this Note and justifiably withstand the
criticisms of the world community, the following four-part test should be
applied by a nation contemplating taking its war against terrorism to the
level suggested in this Note.
First, the violation of another nation's sovereignty should not be the
automatic response to terrorist attacks. Instead, it should be a last-resort
option, conducted only when direct diplomatic negotiations and arbitration
efforts have been exhausted. As long as a possibility of bringing terrorists
before an appropriate criminal tribunal exists, the use of force should be
delayed. It is important to remember that the primary dispute in such a
situation is between the victimized nation and the terrorist organization, not
the 'host' nation. The host nation does, however, make itself a party to the
conflict through its complicity or inability to adequately handle the
situation, and therefore incurs some responsibility to attempt a peaceful and
mutually acceptable outcome.
Second, there must be sufficient evidence that the terrorist group is
linked to the act or acts the victimized nation is responding to. As a proper
measure of self-defense, this includes acts that are being planned, not just
acts that have already occurred. The standard of evidence for this test need
not be in the realm of "beyond a reasonable doubt" as required in a criminal
trial - this test is within the spectrum of war, not a criminal prosecution,
and exact levels of proof may be difficult or impossible to obtain.
Third, the acts of terrorism must be of a "condemnable and shocking"
nature to the world community. Bombing a foreign embassy or military
facility, hijacking or blowing up a civilian passenger plane, or murdering a
high-ranking government official are all acts that would meet this standard.
On the other hand, if bin Laden's only activity was recruiting young
hooligans to throw rocks at U.S. embassies around the world, this element
of the test would not be met.
Fourth, collateral damage must be minimal and the likelihood of
engagement with the armed forces of the nation whose sovereignty is
intruded upon must be avoided at all costs. Some critics of this proposal
may have images of General Pershing's 1916 drive into Mexico with
10,000 soldiers behind him in hot pursuit of Pancho Villa. That is not the
type of action envisioned with this new norm. While the possibility of a
small number of ground troops carrying out the war on terrorism should not
196 This test draws heavily on the assumptions asserted in Section VI(B), infra, under the
sub-heading "Validating Intrusions on Sovereignty."
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be entirely dismissed, the more likely scenario would involve high-tech
weaponry such as cruise missiles and other laser-guided munitions. If a
situation arises where the mission cannot be accomplished without damage
to non-terrorist related property, the government that initiated the attack
must be willing to make reparations. This requirement further reinforces
the point that the primary dispute in such a situation is not between the two
nations.
A final point for consideration, but not necessarily a requirement for
an internationally accepted norm, is a cost-benefit analysis of the planned
mission. Even if the Taliban agrees to cooperate with the United States and
turn bin Laden over, he may still elude any potential captors in the rugged
hills of Afghanistan. As any Russian soldier who fought there in the 1980's
will confirm, conventional military operations in the Afghan terrain were
difficult and casualty intensive. 197  Additionally, it is possible that a
successful attack on bin Laden and his headquarters could actually have the
opposite effect of destabilizing his organization and instead make him a
martyr whose death must be avenged. The bombing of Pan Am flight 103
is an example of how such action could escalate into greater tragedy.
198
C. Summary: Pax Regis
199
While the argument presented herein is for a universally accepted
norm, it cannot be denied that it has decidedly American-centric overtones.
This is no accident. No one can deny that, while many historical threats to
world peace and stability have subsided in recent years, new threats have
200emerged to take their place. Chief among those new threats has been the
197 See, e.g., RAMBO III (Artisan 1988). This is, admittedly, an overly dramatic example,
but is illustrative of the success the guerrilla-style tactics the Afghanis employed had over
the technologically superior Russian forces.
198 See The Long Trail Twisting From Lockerbie, ECONOMIST, Feb. 3, 2001, at 45
(suggesting that the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 that left 270 people dead, was committed
by Libyan agents in retaliation for the 1986 bombing of Muammar Qaddafi's headquarters in
Libya, which was a response to Libya's alleged role in the bombing of a discotheque in
Berlin that killed two American soldiers).
199 "The peace of the king; the peace, good order and security for life and property which
it is one of the objects of government to maintain, and.. .is supposed to guaranty to all
persons within the protection of the law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1128 (6th ed. 1990)
(emphasis added).
200 See, e.g., George Melloan, Assessing Security Threats Isn't Just a War Game, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 20, 2001, at A23 (quoting U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld,
speaking to European diplomats in Munich, Germany: "Today we are safer from the threat
of massive nuclear war...but we are more vulnerable now to the...raw and random violence
of an outlaw regime... .This so-called post-Cold War world is a more integrated world and,
as a result, weapons and technologies... are proliferating and becoming pervasive.. .not just
to nations but to non-state entities.").
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emergence of deadly and unpredictable bands of fanatical terrorists. 20 1 The
United States has largely become the default target of many of these rogue
groups, yet it is one of a few nations who have the means to fight back
effectively. While the current Bush Administration has adopted a quieter
approach to dealing with bin Laden,202 there can be no doubt that he and
others like him are still a threat that is in the forefront of the
administration's foreign policy concerns. The violence bin Laden has
randomly inflicted reinforces the notion that the war against terrorism is
,,203one "that cannot be won by gentlemen's tactics. While the rest of the
world may be slow to accept this radical new conception of how wars may
be fought in the future, the United States cannot stand by as more terrorist
acts against it are contemplated. Taking the lead in establishing this new
norm will surely draw the scornful eye of other nations, but the United
States should not allow that to discourage its efforts. Norms such as the
one proposed in this Note "are almost entirely derived from the responses
of key actors to a critical event. ' '204 Because of its unique position and
capabilities, the United States can expect to be the key actor in leading the
fight against terrorism.
Radical transformations from long-standing practices are bound to
draw harsh criticism. This should not, however, thwart the efforts of the
United States to set the standard for protecting not only its own citizens, but
also those of the rest of the world. As the events in August 1998 in Africa
demonstrate, the citizens of any nation can become the unwitting victims of
international terrorism. The concept of pax regis obligates a government to
provide security to its citizens. By engaging in an aggressive war to
eradicate terrorism, the United States would be fulfilling that obligation not
only to its own citizens but to those of the international community as well.
201 See, e.g., Bin Laden Poses 'Main Threat,' FIN. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2001, at 6 (noting
comments by CIA director George Tenet that "Terrorists are also becoming more
operationally adept and technically sophisticated...").
202 David S. Cloud & Neil King, Jr., U.S. 's Strategy on Saudi Exile Shifts to 'Speak No
Evil,' WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2001, at A26.
203 J. Richard Wilson, Tactics in Response to Terrorism, The Terrorism Research Center,
at http://www.terrorism.con/terrorism/June97c.shtml.
204 Merriam, supra note 123, at 125 (citing Andrew R. Willard, Incidents: An Essay in
Method, in INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS: THE LAW THAT COUNTS IN WORLD POLITICS 5 (W.
Michael Reisman & Andrew R. Willard eds., 1988)).
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